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THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN
ENGLISH-SPEAKING AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Michael L. Perlin

The ordinary test of criminal responsibility is
whether the defendant can tell right from wrong ...
The application of [this] test to a borderline case
can be nothing more than a moral judgment that it is
just or unjust to blame the defendant for what he did.
Legal tests of criminal insanity are not and cannot
be the result of scientific analysis of objective
judgment. . . . The ordinary sense of justice still
operates in terms of punishment. . . . A man who
cannot reason cannot be subject to blame.
The modern science of psychology . . . does not conceive that there is a separate little man in the top
of one's head called reason whose function it is to
guide another unruly little man called instinct,
To
emotion or impulse in the way he should go. . . .
the psychiatrists mental cases are a series of imperceptible gradations from the mild psychopath to the
extreme psychotic, whereas criminal law allows for no
gradations and requires a final decisive moral judgment of the culpability of the accused. For the purposes of conviction there is no twilight zone between
abnormality and insanity. An offender is wholly sane
or wholly insane. Holloway v. U.S., 148 F.2d 665,
666-67 [D.C.Cir. 1945]
This statement by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals predated by some nine years the famed Durham v.
U.S. and by another seven years the significant U.S. v.
Currens decisions.
Its basis In fact has been recognized
by professors,' psychiatrists,
and judges. 3 Yet, its

IGoldstein and Katz, "Abolish the Insanity Defense-Why Not?" 72 Yale L.J. 855 (1963).
2

Menninger, The Human Mind (1937).

3U.S.v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).

significance--and its basis in truth--have gone largely
ignored in the English speaking countries of Africa.
Included in this study are Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya,
Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zambia. With several significant exceptions,
these countries retain the test of the M'Naughten case
of determining criminal responsibility: whether the
defendant can tell right from wrong.
This fact, when
seen in light of the negligible number of practicing
psychiatrists in Africa, points up a glaring need in
that continent for new developments in the field of
criminal law, the insanity defense, and the problems of
responsibility.
Any attempt to make a comparative study of such a subject
area in Africa is at once made more difficult by the
general lack of law codification. Statutory, case and
secondary source material--where available--must all be
independently researched before any cohesive analysis
can be begun.
For the purposes of this paper, the countries of Africa
will be divided into three broad categories: those
which follow a strict M'Naughten Rule, those which follow a more relaxed version of M'Naughten and/or accept
the defense of irresistible impulse, 6 and those which
appear to have, in large measure, rejected the traditional test. As each country is analyzed, in addition,
the available bibliography of cases, statutes, and commentaries will be reviewed.
4"It must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing right from wrong." M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep.
718, 722 (1843).
5

A recent study accounted for only twenty-six south
of the Sahara, ten of whom were in Nigeria. Milner,
African Penal Systems, 320 (1969).
6

See, e.g., Smith v. U.S., 36 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir.
1929).

I.

Pure M'Naughten

GAMBIA
Gambia is among the countries that have retained a practically pristine version of the M'Naughten Rule. Its
statute reads:
A person is not criminally responsible for an act or
omission if at the time of doing the act or making the
omission he is through any disease affecting his mind,
incapable of understanding what he is doing or of
knowing that he ought not to do the act or make the
omission.
But a person may be criminally responsible for an act
or omission although his mind is affected by disease
if such disease does not in fact produce uponhis mind
one or another of the effects above mentioned in
reference to that act or omission. [Laws of Gambia,
ch. 37, sec. 10 (1967).]
No reported cases could be found interpreting this
statute, which is worded identically to the laws of many
On its face it appears to-be
other African nations.
strictly within the confines of M'Naughten, without any
consideration of the psychiatric or legal propositions
which have gone to effectivelyblunt the force of
M'Naughten in many American jurisdictions.
KENYA
The Kenyan statute is identical in wording to the law of
In
Gambia [Laws of Kenya, ch. 63, sec. 13 (Rev. 1962)].
addition, case law has established that the defense of
irresistible impulse is not recognized in Kenya [R. v.
Ebrahim Weraga, 10 E.A.C.A. 48 (1943)], and that mental
disease will be considered from precisely the same point
of view as organic disease. In explaining why a particular defendant did not come within the scope of the
statute, the Kenyan court said, "This is not a case where
a scientific witness can say with certainty, .asoin the
case of a bodily disease, from specific symptoms such as
7

See, i.e., IV Laws of Uganda, ch. 106, sec. 12
(1964).

a rash, a coma or other physical signs, that a disease
exists" [Ellis v. R. (1965) E.A.C.A. 744, 751].
Interestingly, the Kenyan courts have also held that medical evidence is not essential to prove insanity--that
it is a jury question which can be answered dispositively
by lay witnesses [R. v. Kibiro s/o Karioki, 25 L.R.K. 164
(1952)]. This holding seems mildly inconsistent with the
strict adherence to the insanity-as-physiological disorder
doctrine which is cited above. "Wrong" in the statute
has been held to mean "contrary to law" and not "morally"
wrong. Where the defendant claimed that what he was
doing was not wrong according to tribal law, it was held
that this question is an "irrelevant" one [Muswi s/o
Musele v. R., 23 E.A.C.A. 622 (1956)].
The ignorance of the Kenyan courts of the role of the
unconscious in human behavior is apparent in the case of
R. v. Kibiegon Arap Bargutwa [6.E.A.C.A. 142 (1939)].
There the defendant was charged with.the murder of his
father who, the defendant claimed, made-homosexual
attacks upon him. The court held that-the ferocious
killing by the son was not enough-to vitiate responsibility via the insanity defense. The briefest smattering
of reading in Freudian psychoanalysis would showothat,
ordinarily, the threat of such a sexual attack from the
father would so affect the
son's mind that he would not
8
know what he was doing.

There are three major sources of case law in Kenya: The
East African Appeal Reports (E.A.C.A.) covering Kenya,
9
Uganda, and Tanzania; the Kenya Criminal Revision Digest,
serving as a very primary West-type digest in the major
areas of criminal law; and the Digest and Guide to-the
Criminal Law of Kenya,1 0 including most of the relevant
E.A.C.A. cases. Lack of comprehensive indexing of the
8See, generally, Freud, A General Introduction to
Psychoanalysis (1924); Brenner, An Elementary Textbook of
Psychoanalysis (1955).
9Trevelyan, Kenya Criminal Revision Digest (1897-1964)
(1965).
10

Spurling, Digest and Guide to the Criminal Law
of
Kenya (1964).

E.A.C.A. reports, of course, must seriously retard progress

in scholarship in this area.
MALAWI
Under the laws of Nyassaland, the insanity defense is
couched in the same language as the Gambia-Kenya statutes
[Laws of Nyassaland, ch. 23, sec. 12 (1957)]; there is no
indication that this wording has been changed in any substantial form since the nation achieved its independence
1
as the state of Malawi.
The few relevant reported cases repeat the M'Naughten
dogma, stating explicitly: "The law laid down in M'Naughten
• ..is the law of Nyassaland" [Pulumero v. R., IV Ny.
L.R. 101, 102 (1938); R. v. Eni, (1923-1960)'A.L.R. Mal.
428 (1957)].
It is emphasized that this test applies to
the reasonable man and not to the particular defendant
charged, a formulation which again is contrary to the
vast body of psychological and psychiatric thought [R. v.
Chao (1923-1960) A.L.R. Mal. 189 (1950)]. Again, medical
testimony is discussed as "mere opinion" which cannot be
used to establish the insanity defense unless facts can
be presented to the members of the jury so that they can
determine whether or not the defendant is responsible
[R. v. Mandala (1957) R&N.L.R. 251].

Sources are sparse in Malawi. There are a few volumes of
Nyassaland Law Reports, again poorly codified; the Malawi
edition of the African Law Reports, which contains some
relevant cases; and the Rhodesian and Nyassaland Law
Reports which emphasize the Rhodesian decisions.12
New post-independence Malawi reports could not be found
and there is apparently no relevant commentary.
11

The laws of Malawi have not as yet been printed
in
codified form. An examination of the bound slip-sheets
reveals no new penal code. However, in the new Criminal
Procedure Code, a section dealing with court procedures
at trial time refers to a defendant "by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of knowing the nature of his act
or that it was wrong or contrary to law."
Malawi Acts
"Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code," sec. 134 (1967).
12

Mandela, a Nyassaland case, is incorrectly
listed in
Cartwright'and Read, Penal Codes of East and Central
Africa and the Gambia (19t3) as a N. Rhodesian case (p. 3).

TANZANIA
Since there has been no official compilation of laws
since the state of Tanzania was created, it cannot be
ascertained whether or not there has been any new formulation of the penal law since that time. 1 3 There is no
indication that there has been any change from the law of
either Tanganyika or Zanzibar, both of which adopted the
M'Naughten formulation in the same phraseology as the
states already discussed [The Laws of Tanganyika, ch. 16,
sec. 13 (Rev. 1961); I The Laws of Zanzibar, ch. 13,
sec. 12 (1961)].
The case law of Tanganyika is not particularly instructive--one early case merely restates the M'Naughten
principles [R- v. Salim Bin Saidi, 1 T.L.R.(R.) 123
(1930)], another rejects the irresistible impulse argument [R. v. Mazabia Bin Mkomi, 8 E.A.C.A. 85 (1941)].
Another case [Republic v. Saidi Kabila Kuinga (1963)
E.A.C.A. 1 (Hi. Ct.)], interestingly, points out, "The
graver the alleged offense, the greater the suspicion
with which the accused's own assertions of his insanity
should be regarded," a position which certainly indicates,
to some extent, a basic mistrust of the entire area of
psychology.
The Zanzibar cases go no further in analyzing the component problems of the insanity defense. In both Zanzibar
and Tanganyika, the courts limit the responsibility of a
defendant claiming partial delusion to a situation which
legally assumes the reality of the delusion [R. v.
Gererazi s/o Lutabingwa, 9 E.A.C.A. 56 (Tang.-4l);
k. v. Mahuna bin Kashiba, 7 Z.L.R. 59 (1944)]. Here,
again, the mentally ill-person is treated like a reasonable person with one compartmentalized disorder which can
be severed from the healthy remainder and treated in
vacu , a theory of behavior which has largely been
rejected elsewhere among psychiatrists and psychologists.

With the exception of some E.A.C.A. cases, a smattering
of Zanzibar Law Reports and a few old Tanganyika Law
13A careful examination of the session law slip-sheets
of Tanzania shows no Penal Code.

Reports, there is little source material from Tanzania.
The Tanzania Law Reports have been issued in slip-sheet
style (unindexed) since the state was created in 1965,
but there are no cases in point. There is no applicable
commentary to be found anywhere.
UGANDA
The lawlof Uganda is, again, the strict M'Naughten formulation,
and, as in the countries already discussed,
irresistible impulse is not recognized as.a defense
[R. v. Ebrahim Weranga s/o Wamala, 10 E.A.C.A. 48 (1943)].
Again, the defense will be considered as if the operative
facts about which the defense was deluded were real:
Given that [defendant] believed insanely in the
wickedness of the [deceased] family, is she to be
excused if knowingly she takes her revenge by killing
members of that family?

.

.

.

It is the attitude of

mind toward the actual deed that must be regarded.
The crazy [sic] nature of the motive which prompts
the deed is, I think irrelevant [R. v. Kabande w/o
Kihigue, 15 E.A.C.A. 135, 136 (1948)].
A later case notes: "There is no distinction for purposes of ascertaining criminal responsibility, between
diseases which have a mental and those which have a
physical origin. .

.

.

The law merely-has to consider

the state of mind in which the accused now is, not how he
got there" [Tadeo Oyee s/o Duru v. R., (1959) E.A.C.A.
407, 409, 410 (C.A.)]. 15 Here again, the role of the
unconscious in human behavior is totally ignored by the
court, an error which cannot be overemphasized
in any
16
study of the problem of responsibility.

Source material is not quite as scarce in Uganda as in
some of the other countries discussed above. Besides
14

IV Laws of Uganda, ch. 106, sec. 12 (1964).

15N.B.
Dunn
16

.

This case is incorrectly referred to as

.

. . in Cartwright and Read, supra at 2.

See, generally, Katz, Goldstein and Dershowitz,
Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and Law (1967).

.

17
E.A.C.A. cases (which are somewhat more plentiful here),
there are two hornbooks available, one of which offers
18
only a cursory explanation of the penal code section,
and one which elaborates on the code deriving the
M'Naughten formulation more completely. 19 The latter book
separates those exempted from mental responsibility into
persons born insane and those who became insane as a
result of disease or injur--a distinction which the cases
2
seem to ignore or reject.

ZAMBIA
Here again the strictness with which the statute adheres
21
to the original British law is emphasized by the courts.
Demeanor and lack of motive are all "unreliable" and "of
little relevance" under the pure M'Naughten language
[R. v. Tempi, (1961) R.& N.L.R. 858].
Irresistible
impulse is once more rejected as a defense to a criminal
charge [R. v. Carson, (1957) R.&N.L.R. 288].
"Wrong" is
strictly construed as legally wrong, not morally wrong,
thus depriving a defendant suffering from "paranoic ...
psychosis" from asserting an insanity defense [Golowa v.
R. (1964) R.&N.L.R. (F.S.C. 1964)]. Insanity is seen as
a jury question, not a medical question [R. v. Wolomosi
Phiri, V L.R. N. 184 (1952); the fact that a defendant
suffers from total amnesia (and thus cannot remember any
of the circumstances connected with the offense) in no
way establishes a defense at trial [R. v. Phiri, (1958)
R.&N.L.R. 1008].
In one case where it was established that a mute defendant's dumbness arose from hysteria, it was termed "a
psychological disease

. . . an emotional disturbance, and

17

There are no relevant cases in the Uganda L.R. series.

18

Brown, Criminal Procedure in Uganda and Kenya
(1965).

19

Brown and Allen, An Introduction to the Law of Uganda
(1968).
20

Ibid., at 88.

211 Laws of Republic of Zambia, ch. 6, sec. 13 (1967);
Laws of N. Rhodesia, Penal Cd., sec. 13 (1957).

not a disturbance of the reason," and the defendant's
insanity plea was rejected [R. v. Jailos Jonato, V L.R.
N.R. 726 (1952)]. This explanation of hysteria is distinctly at odds with the predominant conception of that
psychopathology, a neurotic disorder in which unreasonable
anxiety is converted into Ahysical symptoms as a result
Again, the new dimension in
of unconscious conflicts. 2
psychology and psychiatry has not come to the Zambia.

No post-independence Zambia cases could be found. The
Rhodesia and Nyassaland Law Reports contain some relevant
cases, and others are reported in the Law Reports of
Northern Rhodesia. Otherwise, though, there are neither
hornbooks nor commentaries dealing with this subject
matter.

In addition, there are two other sources which attempt to
cover a number of notions: the Digest of East African
-Criminal Case Law and the Sourcebook of the Criminal-Law
of Africa. 2 3 The Digest enumerates the different subject
areas of criminal law in the study of Kenya, Tanzania,
and Uganda, briefly synopsizing all major decisions in
each area. The Sourcebook, on the other hand, appears to
be closer to a genuine textbook, with a2 eparate chapter
on M'Naughten and the insanity defense.
It includes
basic materials, including the M'Naughten case, sample
statutes, an article by the famed criminal law scholar
Stephen, and relevant African cases--the Oyee son of Duru
decision of Uganda, for example, an interesting Uganda
case where an exception for witchcraft is made in a situation where the defendant lived "far away in the bush"
and where he was so obsessed with being bewitched that
his mind was held to be diseased [R. v. Magata s/o
Kachehokano (1957) E.A.C.A. 330 (Hi. Ct. Ug.), cited at
i. 3881. There are also two important Nigerian cases,
to be discussed below. This is the most comprehensive
22

Frazier and Carr, Introduction to Psychopathology,
142 (1964).
23

Rosen and Stratton, A Digest of East African Criminal
Case Law, 1897-1954 (1957); Seidman, A Sourcebook of the
Criminal Law of Africa (1966).
24

Ibid., at 374- 98.

study of the criminal law of English speaking Africa, but
still it does not deal thoroughly with most of the problems raised by the insanity defense.
II.

Modified M'Naughten

ETHIOPIA
The relevant sections of the Ethiopian penal code read:
A person is not responsible for his acts under the law
when, owing to age, illness, abnormal delay in his
development or a deterioration of his mental faculties,
he was incapable at the time of his act of understanding the nature or consequences of his act, or of regulating his conduct according to such understanding.
[Penal Code of Ethiopia, Art. 48(1), (1957)]
He who owing to a derangement of his mind or understanding, or arrested mental development or an abnormal
or deficient condition was not, at the time of his act,
fully capable of understanding the nature and consequences thereof or regulating his conduct according
to such understanding shall not be liable in full to
the punishment. [Penal Code of Ethiopia, Art. 49(1),
(1957)]
The differences between the Ethiopian code and the
M'Naughten formulation are striking. Here, the causes of
not understanding the act are listed, and comprehension
of the consequences of an act is as important as comprehension of the nature of the act. There are eleborate
conditions upon which to premise the purging of partial
responsibility, including the vague "abnormal or
deficient condition."
The leading case in Ethiopia, though, interprets these
statutes restrictively. When the defendant's doctor testified that the defendant was a "constitutional psychopath . . . emotionally pathological . . . [on whom] the
unusual amount of stress and strain is too strong . .
and may bring about an unusually pronounced tendency to
yield to impulses of violence without restraint," the
court rejected the insanity defense. It found two criteria upon which it could base its decision: psychological criteria affecting intelligence and psychological
criteria affecting volition. Since it found that the

defendant fully understood the nature and consequences of
his acts and merely was inclined to use less resistance
than another person, it affirmed his conviction [Ato
Getatchew Gizaw v. Adv. Gen'l, Sup. Imp. Ct. (1959), 1
J. Eth. L.71 (1964)].
A commentator has formulated a "biophysical method" for
interpretation of the insanity defense statute: a person
is irresponsible when he is in such physical or mental
condition (biological cause) that he is totally deprived
of his mental faculties (psychological effect); these
two must be linked by causal relation. 2 5 In addition, he
showed awareness of a major concept in the area of mental
illness: "Between insanity and sanity, which in any
event are conditions whose frontiers are imprecise,
there exist intermediate stages. ''2 6 Too often the
M'Naughten principle ignores these crucial intermediate
stages--the gray area in which most of mankind is often
operative. The limited responsibility statute, if
availed of, can prove to be a significant development in
this area of the law.

There are two major--and reputable--sources in Ethiopia:
Lowenstein's Materials on Comparative-Criminal Law and
Graven's Introduction to Ethiopian Penal Law. Lowenstein's text compares the Ethiopian and'the Swiss penal
systems and includes relevant statutes, cases (there are
few in this area) and articles (includip a perceptive
and far-reaching attack on M'Naughten). 7 Graven's work,
an elaborate and complete analysis of the penal code,
interprets each section fully and is one of the major
works of scholarship in the field of African criminal law.
LIBERIA
In the Liberian code, "an act otherwise criminal done by
a person who is an idiot imbecile, lunatic or who is
insane is not a crime. ''28 To come within this section,
25

Graven, An Introduction to Ethiopian Penal Law, 134

(1965).
26

Ibid., at 136.

27

Weihofer, "Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense,"
in Lowenstein, op. cit., 161.
28

Liberian Code of Laws, Title 27, sec. 14 (1956).

it must be shown that, at the time of committing the
alleged crime, the defendant "was laboring under such
defects of understanding as not to know either a) the
nature of the act he was doing or b) that the act was
wrong.vt29
There is a severe lack of relevant cases which have interpreted the statute section. The only case law holds that
insanity must be proven by a medical expert, not merely
by law witnesses [Carew v. Jessenah, 13 L.L.R. 168 (1958)];
that murder (implying intent) must be committed by a person of "sound memory and discretion" [Padmore v. Republic,
3 L.L.R. 418, 421 (1933)]; and that it would be a reasonable error if the trial court denied the defendant
(charged with murder in the first degree) the right to
produce witnesses to testify that he suffered from temporary spells of insanity [Tay v. Republic, 9 L.L.R. 92
(1945)]. Other than these cases, there are neither
reported decisions nor comments on the Libaria insanity
law.

The Cornell University Law School has completed a codification of the Liberian statutory materials (non-annotated).
Unfortunately the cases have been neither systematically
reported nor collated and, as a result, there is little
information which can be gleaned. No commentary of any
sort on the criminal law of Liberia could be found.
III.

Non-M'Naughten

SOMALI
The Somali Penal Code states: "Whoever at the moment
when he committed an act was by reason of infirmity in a
state of mind such as to preclude ipacity, understanding
In addition, it
and volition shall not be liable."
provides:
"No one may be punished for an act or omission
31
. . . unless he has done it knowingly or willfully.
This latter provision is referred to as the "psychological
32
element" which consists of "wilful and conscious intent."
29Id., sec.
15.
30

Angeloni, The Somali Penal Code, sec. 50 (1967).

311d., sec. 23.

32

Id. at 13.

Although there are netiher cases nor commentary, it
appears that "capacity, understanding and volition" is a
broad test, going far beyond the "nature of the act"
scope of M'Naughten. The inclusion of "conscious" intent
as a prerequisite for a volitional act is also of great
significance--it acknowledges sub silentio that behavior
is often determined by unconscious impulses and motivations and that such behavior cannot be treated as arising
from intentional actions. If this explanation is ever
given wide interpretation it would prove to be a major
break with the past in the field of the insanity defense.
Unfortunately there has been an utter lack of scholarship
here, so there can only be conjecture as to how the code
will ultimately be interpreted by the courts.
SUDAN
In the Sudan, "No act is an offense which is done by a
person who at the time of doing it did not possess the
power of appreciating the nature of his acts or of controlling them by reason of a p manent or temporary
insanity or mental infirmity.
Here the courts have squarely held: "Our law is different
from England's. We do not recognize the English test of
the lack of knowledge that the act the defendant does is
wrong or contrary to law" [Sudan Gov't v. Mousa Adam
Isha, (1958) S.L.J.R. 1,2]. Under section 50, nature
is meant to imply both "quality" and the "operator of
external agencies." Schizophrenia (Sudan Gov't v. Mousa
Adam Ishag, (1958) S.L.J.R. 1,2], paranoid delusion
[Sudan Gov't v.-Gabia Angello Dafaalla, (1961) S.L.J.R.
32], and epileptic fits inducing unconsciousness [Sudan
Gov't v. Ahmed El Obeid Saghayroun, (1961) S.L.J.R. 123]
were held to come within the scope of the statute. In
addition, where someone was emotionally unstable to an
abnormal degree and suffering from melancholia, but not
"wholly destitute of the use of reason," he was not
excused totally (section 50), although punishment was
mitigated as a result of partial.insanity [Sudan Gov't v.
Nafisa Dafalla Mohamed, (1961) S.L.J.R. 199].
33

Laws of the Sudan, ch. XXIV, sec. 50
(1953).

The administrative branch of the court system even suggested a test to determine insanity:
a) at the time of the act did the defendant possess
the power of appreciating the nature of the act?
b) if so, did he possess the power of controlling
it?
c) if the answer to a) or b) is 'no' was his
inability to appreciate or control the result of permanent or temporary insanity or mental infirmity?
[Sudan Gov't v. Khidir Abdalla El Husseir, (1966)
S.L.J.R. 110]
In addition, of course, the Sudanese code expressly recognizes the defense of irresistible impulse (see f. 33,
supra). Clearly, the English rule and the English methodology have been fully discarded. Other African jurisdictions might do well to examine the case law which has
built up here and consider it as a partial model for their
own penal systems.

The Sudan Law Journal Reports are a relatively comprehensive compilation of relevant cases and articles for the
last decade. Before 1959, though, there is little available information. The Sudan Law Reports, beginning in
1900, offer no cases whatsoever in this area.
There is one significant commentary comparing the Sudanese
and Northern Nigeria Penal Codes which effectively, if
briefly, summarizes the law of the Sudan
specially as
it differs from M'Naughten) in this area.
GHANA
In a unique statutory formulation, the Ghana code reads:
When a person is accused of crime, [he can plead
insanity]-a) if he was prevented, by reason of idiocy, imbecility, or any mental derangement or disease affecting
the mind, from knowing the nature or consequences of
the act in respect of which he is accused; or
34

Gledhill, The Penal Codes of Northern Nigeria and
the Sudan (1963).

b) if he did the act under the influence of an
insane delusion of such a nature as to render him an
unfit subject for punishment of any kind.

[Criminal

Code of Ghana, Act 29, sec. 27 (1960)]
It is apparent that this test goes beyond M'Naughten in
its inclusion of imbecility and idiocy, and in its focus

on the consequences, as well as the nature, of the act.
The test becomes, in effect, one of "foreseeability":
does the defendant have the capacity to foresee the
results of his conduct? Under the first section of the
test, a unity of the mind, not the fragmentation of the
cognitive function envisioned by M'Naughten, is contem-

plated. Under the second section, 3 the
defense of
5
irresistible impulse is permitted.
Case law in Ghana has been somewhat surprisingly inconsistent in view of the enlightened statute.

Where the

defendant had an insane delusion that his father had hurt
his mother and hated him, the court held that, since
punishment would be pointless, the delusion was sufficient for the insanity defense [St. v. Ayaabi Kusasi,
Jan-June Cyclostyled Judgments 56 (Ct. App. 1958)].
It was also held, in an early case, that occurrence of a
lucid interval would not negate evidence of prevailing
insanity, since the court said that it was commonplace
"for an insane person to be occasionally 'calm"' [R. v.
Grumah, 1 G.L.R. 307 (1959)]. The courts reversed direction to some extent, though, in finding that insanity was
purely a jury question for lay witnesses [R. v. Kwandwo
Mensah, I G.L.R. 309 (1959)], and that hysterical amnesia
(a severe neurotic disorder) could not be used to support
a plea of insanity [R. v. Yeboah, 1 G.L.R. 434 (1959)].
In its most anachronistic decision the court disallowed
the insanity defense in a case where it was conceded
defendant Dagarti had insanity delusions and where he
heard others singing tribal songs about i4s alleged
impotency (a clear symptom of paranoia).
Here the
court, in a M'Naughten-like holding, found that, to come
35

See, generally, Seidman, "Insanity as a Defense Under

the Criminal Code of 1960," 1 U. Ghana L.J. 42 (1964).
36

Frazier and Carr, op. cit., at 143.

under the section 27(b), the delusion must be of such a
nature that if the imagined facts were true they would
provide justification for the action taken as a result of
the delusion [Kwame Dagarti, July-Dec. Cyclostyled Judgments 15 (S.Ct. 1960)].
After this low-water mark, though, the cases began a
gradual upswing. In a case where it held that the nature
of the insanity and not the form which the delusion takes
is the controlling factor, the court reaffirmed the
earliest cases and ignored Dagarti [Sergeant Bodie, Crim.
Appl. 31/33 (1964)]. This was buttressed by a later
decision which, citing the early cases, approved of the
irresistible impulse defense and noted that the essence
of the insane delusion cases is the state of mind of the
defendant, not what the situation would be if the imagined
facts were true [St. v. Yaw Manu @ Yaw Owurso, 3 Curr.
Cases PP 106 (S.Ct. 1965)]. Finally, the Dagarti case
was expressly overruled in State v. Akpawey, a 1966 decision. The court noted:
To punish a person in [a deluded] state of mind,
whether the purpose be deterent, preventive, reformative or retributive, ridicules the law.
It is the degree or quality of the incapability of the
mind which caused the delusion and not the nature of
the subject or the substance of the particular delusion which decides the issue.
If the state of mind which hatched the delusion is
such that imposition of the normal punishment provided
for the offence committed will not serve any of these
[jurisprudential] purposes, the punishment will be
pointless.
[St. v. Akpawey, 4 Curr. Cases PP 87
(S.Ct. 1966)]
It is hoped that the Ghana courts will follow the lead of
this case by allowing Dagarti to remain buried and by continuing to adhere to the more enlightened procedures set
down in these most recent cases.

Relevant cases can be found in the Ghana Law Reports and
in the slip-sheet Cyclostyled Judgments and Current Cases.
None of the latter, unfortunately, are codified or
indexed, so the material loses much of its potential

research value. The University of Ghana Law Journal has
dealt comprehensively with the subject of insanity at
least once--it must be condensed as potential source
material for the future.
Milner's work on African penology 3 7 deals with the law of
Ghana in this area but must be considered extremely
critically, in view of the fac 8 that the post-1960 cases
are mentioned only in passing.
As in the Sudan, the case law of Ghana should be compulsory reading for the law revision committees and courts
of the other African countries.
NIGERIA
Under the penal codes of Nigeria and the Western Region
of Nigeria
it is stated that:
A person is not criminally responsible for an act or
omission if at the time of doing the act he is in
such a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity as to deprive him of the capacity to understand
what he is doing or of capacity to control his actions
or of capacity to know that he ought not to do the act.
37

See n. 5, supra.
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A reading of Milner would indicate that the Dagarti

case is still the law of Ghana. He cites Sergeant Bodie
and Akpawey in a footnote but ignores both their relevance and the latter's express overruling of Dagarti.
Id. at 335 and n. 101 at 359.
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The Northern Region envisions a different test:
"Nothing is an offense which is done by a person who at
the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind,
is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he
is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law." The
Laws of Northern Nigeria, sec. 51 (1965). As interpreted,
this law is treated like M'Naughten, with the additional
defense of irresistible impulse. Gledhill, supra at 96.
However, this is limited in application to the northern
region of the country.

A person whose mind at the time of his doing or
omitting to do an act is affected by delusions on some
specific matters, but who is not otherwise entitled to
the benefit of the foregoing provisions of this section, is criminally responsible for the act to the
same extent as if the real state of things had been as
he was induced by the delusions to believe to exist.
[Nigerian Criminal Code, sec. 28 (Rev. 1963); Western
Region of Nigeria Criminal Code, sec. 26 (1963)]
In the leading case of Sunday Omoni, it is expressly
stated that the Nigerian code is not the same as
M'Naughten because of the inclusion of "natural mental
infirmity" in the Nigerian test and by allowing "incapacity
to control his actions" to relieve a defendant from criminal responsibility [R. v. Sunday Omoni, 12 W.A.C.A. 511
(1949)].
Clearly, the "incapacity" contemplated goes
beyond the questions of cognition and legal right or
wrongness. M'Naughten is also departed from in those
cases holding that the defense of irresistible impulse is
available here [R. v. Nasamu, 6 W.A.C.A. 74 (1940)].
In other cases, it is held that the evidence of insanity
of ancestors or blood relations is admissible (another
step never contemplated by M'Naughten), although medical
evidence is not essential [R. v. Inyang, 12 W.A.C.A. 5
(1946)]. Although, generally, the question of motive is
immaterial, where there is sufficient evidence indicative
of insanity the absence of any evidence of motive may
become relevant to the point at issue [R. v. Ashigifuwo,
12 W.A.C.A. 389 (1948)].
In a somewhat contrary decision, the court rejected an
insanity plea where it held that "the illness which the
defendant was suffering from was pain in the body and not
any disease of the mind" [Dim v. R., 14 W.A.C.A. 154
(1952)], not a particularly enlightened reading of the
law, where the defendant suffered from hysterical
amnesia. However, in a more recent decision, the court
accepted the insanity plea where the defendant's medical
witness asserted that the defendant's persecution complex
was "a paranoid delusion disorder" [Att'y Gen'l v. Titi
Owhofejeobu, V Nigerian Bar J. 73 (1964)].
Generally, then, the courts in Nigeria appear to be aware
that they are taking the direction away from M'Naughten
and that new dimensions to the problems of criminal
responsibility have arisen in the last century.

No other country in English-speaking Africa has the
wealth of literature in this area as does Nigeria. Brett
and McLean 40 analyze the relevant statutes, reproduce the
significant cases and offer commentary on the problems
raised. Aguda 4 1 delves deeply into the question of mental
responsibility, noting that under the Nigerian code,
"senile and depressive psychosis . . . schizophrenia an
2
neuroses" may all be sufficient to eliminate liability.
Hedges analyzes the impact of the Sunday Omoni 4 ase and
considers 4he other key decisions cited above.
Okonkwo
and Naish
discuss the problems inherent in attempting
to define legal terms by medical principles and suggest
wisely:
"The definition of criminal responsibility should.
be left reasonably flexible so as to ,llow for changing
standards and progress in knowledge." 5 In addition, they
recite other African cases and some American decisions
(including Durham), a practice which should be emulated
by more text writers.
Okonkwo and McLean present a casebook on criminal law
which devotes a chapter to the problems of responsibility. 4 6 As one of the first such casebooks in its field,
it must be strongly commended for its attempts to bring
the relevant criminal cases to the law student of
Nigeria.
Case sources similarly abound in Nigeria. The West
African Appeal Cases (W.A.C.A.) predominate--they are
40

Brett and McLean, The Criminal Law and Procedure of
Lagos, Eastern Nigeria and Western Nigeria (1963).
41Aguda, Principles of Criminal Liability in Nigerian
Law (1965).
421d. at 267.
43

Hedges, Introduction to the Criminal Law of Nigeria
(1962).
44Okonkwo and Naish, Criminal Law in Nigeria (1964).
45
46

Id. at 129.

Oknokwo and McLean, Cases on the Criminal Law, Procedure and Evidence of Nigeria (1966).

cumulatively indexed in fifteen year periods. There are
also Nigeria Law Reports, Nigerian Monthly Law Reports
(dealing primarily with the Western Region), Law Reports
of the High Court of the Federal Territory of Lagos,
Federal Supreme Court Reports, Western Region Law Reports,
a Nigerian Law Journal (dedicated to presenting cases of
"great topical interest") and the Nigerian Bar Journal.
Clearly, a relationship between the proliferation of cases
and of literature can be found in at least this one case.

CONCLUSIONS
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it appears that the courts of Africa have
In summary,
been derelict in taking notice of the new knowledge of
human behavior. Although there are some exceptions, generally the dereliction on the part of the courts is somewhat inversely proportional to the amount of reported
cases and secondary source materials. The fact, though,
that there are a few countries which have made major
advances in the field of mental responsibility indicates
that it is not a hopeless task ;hich faces the courts of
Africa, merely one which will require the explicit discarding of over 100 years of law and dogma.
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Sierra Leone was not considered since neither cases,
commentary nor statutory material could be obtained. The
one relevant statute dealing with the presentation of
the insanity defense at trial only speaks in passing of
one "insane so as not to be responsible for his act."
However, neither insanity nor responsibility are in any
way defined. I Laws of Sierra Leone, ch. 39, sec. 66
(1960).

